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The research project presented below delves into the largest and most significant challenges that 
start-up founders face between their ideation and first round of investment phases. Through 
literature review on the subject matter it is postulated that these are mostly related to lengthy 
legal procedures, a lack of a science-based approach to building a business, and tensions between 
partners and investors of the start-ups. However, interviews reveal that the issues most present in 









This work used infrastructure and resources funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia 
(UID/ECO/00124/2013, UID/ECO/00124/2019 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209), 
POR Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209) 





The thesis presented here marks the conclusive step for the Master’s in Management at NOVA 
School of Business and Economics. I hereby seize this opportunity to give special recognition to 
those who have, in widely distinctive ways, accompanied me through this process. It has been 
vastly interesting to delve deeper into the indescribably innovative and fast-paced start-up 
ecosystem, and acquaint myself with founders in Portugal wiling to push boundaries  Firstly, to 
my professor and advisor João Castro, for introducing me to the topic of “innovation” in a 
business perspective, for expanding my view of entrepreneurship, and for giving me guidance 
and support, I direct my most sincere appreciation. To the founders who have agreed whole-
heartedly to participate in the interviews, and the bright pixel organization as a whole, but 
especially to Frederico Santos who has been a not only an advisor but also a mentor, I express 
my deep gratitude. To my parents and my sister, undoubtably the kindest, and brightest people I 
am certain to ever meet, thank you for giving me direction, motivation, and love. Lastly, to my 
best friends, for the companionship, inspiration, drive, talent, that transpire through each and 
every aspect of my life, transforming the ubiquitous into extraordinary, I am deeply humbled and 
utterly blessed for having you in my life.  









1.1. Relevance & Motivation 
One third of the reasons for start-ups’ failures are related to product-to-market fit. The remaining 
two thirds stem from decisions taken by founders, and their relationship with the ecosystem in 
which they operate. These were the findings of Wasserman (2008) after analyzing more than 
10,000 start-ups across several venture capital firms’ portfolios. The Portuguese government has 
been pushing and subsidizing its start-up ecosystem in order to boost and facilitate commerce 
and favor the proliferation of successful start-ups. (Ministério da Economia, 2018) However, and 
despite its 2 unicorns, it is now forecasted that Portugal won’t produce many highly successful 
companies in the near future. (StartupBlink, 2019). For founders, aiming to beat the destiny and 
adverse odds laid out for them, it is crucial that the decisions – that end up bringing most to their 
untimely collapse – are as best advised and informed as possible. Studying the challenges and 
“pain-points” of established start-ups not only benefits future founders themselves, but also the 
incubators whose purpose is to advise and steer their partners’ success. In an environment where 
a wrong move can prove fatal and time is of the essence, knowledge, alignment, and experience 
tend to fuel successful endeavors.  
1.2. Problem Definition 
To provide a better understanding of possibly avoidable setbacks faced by founders, and ways in 
which incubators can offer better focused help, the thesis aims to answer the question: Which 





2. Literature review 
The writings that follow are intended to contribute to a better understanding of the external and 
internal factors that affect a start-up’s success in general, and more specifically in Portugal. It is 
divided into sections, each dealing with a subset of these influential factors.  
2.1. The Portuguese “Doing Business Report” 
Figure 1 Doing Business Report 2019 
Every year, the World Bank Group produces its flagship report on the readiness and agility of 
countries regarding business ventures, the “Doing Business Report”. The latest edition, 
encompasses 190 economies of the world, and ranks them regarding 10 distinct categories, 
“starting a business”; “dealing with construction permits”; ”getting electricity”; “registering 
property”; “getting credit”; “protecting minority investors”; “trading across boarders”; 
“enforcing contracts”; and “resolving insolvency”.  According to the report, and highlighted by 
the group itself, Portugal ranks 39th even though being recognized with some of the most 




economies regarding “starting a business” with a score of 90.75 out of a possible 100. The report 
gives focus to reforms taken by the government that have reduced time and costs for company 
formalization, which seem to have increased the number of start-ups by 17%, boosting 
employment. Portugal boasts a perfect score of 100 out of 100 in the category of “trading across 
boarders” with a liberal and unbureaucratic approach. However, as previously stated, there are 
criteria that present challenging to the country’s score elevation. For aspects such as tax payment 
bureaucracy, time to register property, and costs to export (US$), Portugal preforms the worst 
out of the economies considered. Furthermore, and as of relevance for start-ups, Portugal appears 
to struggle in both legal and financial fields, hindering its overall score. On the parameter 
“getting credit”, Portugal scores a measly 40 out of 100 mostly due to “credit bureau coverage” 
which reports the number of individuals with track record of borrowing history from the past five 
years. Lastly, the report demonstrates a weaker “protection of minority investors” as a result of a 
sub-par performance in “extents of shareholders rights” and “director liability”.  
2.2. The Portuguese Start-up Ecosystem 
For the analysis of the Portuguese start-up ecosystem, both national and international reports and 
databases were reviewed so as to present a more comprehensive overview, namely StartUP 
Portugal’s national strategy plan starting in 2016 through 2020, the “StartupBlink” annual report 
of 2019, and  the collaborative work of Get in the ring and Halbe &Koenraads “An overview of 
the Portuguese entrepreneurship ecosystem” edited in 2018.  
The Portuguese ministry of Economics, through StartUP Portugal, has devised several measures 




were revised in 2018, and 20 were added in the same year, demonstrating its dynamism. In order 
to strengthen its support, StartUp Portugal directed these new measures at three pillars, 
ecosystem, financing, and internationalization. For example, regarding the former, Startup Hub 
(measure no.1), intends to be a digital platform for start-up mapping and matchmaking, while 
also centralizing all the available types of support accessible nationally, InovGov (measure no. 4) 
moves towards building better networks between the public sector, the big corporations, and 
start-ups.  
The “StartupBlink” report evaluates the performance of 1000 cities in 100 different countries and 
ranks them, much like the aforementioned report in the previous sub-section, using a 
mathematical algorithm that weighs the three main criteria, quantity, quality and business 
environment. Throughout its lifetime (beginning in 2017) Portugal has dropped 5 places in the 
overall ranking standing at 29th, and 13th in Europe. Lisbon, which was part of the top 50 for the 
last 2 years, has dropped 20 places and ranks now at 67th. Other major start-up hubs such as 
Porto and Braga, although experiencing a milder blow, have seen their ranks tumble. The report 
credits this downturn mainly to governmental action. On one hand, the positive updraft in the 
Portuguese economy might drive costs of living to rise, while on the other hand, as stated in the 
report, the Portuguese government might be falling victim to the hype of events such as the 
“Web Summit”, event that cost 128 million to close the deal on location permanency. Moreover, 
Lisbon seems to be in the process of becoming a trendy location for expats, digital nomads and 
lifestyle business owners, none of which are predicted to develop unicorn type star-ups, and high 






The second report, and as per illustrated in 
Figure 2. assesses the ecosystems through the 
lens of 5 different factors, network, 
education, support, capital and expertise. It 
highlights several figures prior to a deeper 
analysis, the first being that Portugal ranks 9th 
out of 60 in access to talent, that its 
environment comprises more than 150 
incubators and accelerators, and that it is the first country in the European Union to create a 
special Visa for foreigner start-up founders. Starting with the criteria in the respective order, the 
report pinpoints events alike the “Web summit”, and organizations focused on creating a thriving 
ecosystem, such as Startup Portugal and DNA Cascais, as crucial factors towards the positive 
development of an entrepreneurial networking environment. Following, the Portuguese start-up 
ecosystem benefits from having a pool of highly educated founders and several prestige higher 
education institutions that adopt the methods of the Entrepreneurial School for entrepreneurial 
learning. Support, the next category, focuses on previously mentioned aspects, particularly the 
governmental efforts to lessen the bureaucratic burden placed on founders of new ventures, and 
tax alleviation. Here, the Portuguese ecosystem is, again, framed positively. Much like the 
“StartupBlink” report, regarding capital, the economic crisis that might have bolstered a new 
generation of entrepreneurs, did not do the same for capital availability directed at fueling these 
newfound ventures. However small, comparing to other countries in OCED, VC investment has 




been increasing, according to the report. The government-led Portugal Ventures holds 450 
million in funds aimed at innovative tech companies and startups. Lastly, concerning expertise, 
here defined as access to specialists with specific knowledge that the founders do not have in-
house, the report emphasizes “Portuguese science parks” – places that offer a wide range of 
business support services, ranging from co-working spaces to support services for intellectual 
property and product development – as strong contributors to creating a sense of community and 
propelling the exchange of knowledge.     
2.3. Founder’s & Startups’ “pain points” 
As recommended by Frederico Santos, mentor and advisor to this thesis, two relevant best-
selling books’ insights draw a starting point for the further understanding and elucidation of the 
research question. 
In Eric Ries’s book, “The Lean Startup”, building a start-up is a process which should be 
undergone through scientific techniques and a systematic, rational approach; thus, it follows a 
guide-like structure accompanying the growth of said start-up. Beginning with Vision, it 
proposes a discipline of entrepreneurial management and articulates a way of gauging if start-ups 
are progressing, denominated “validated learning”. Following with Steering, which highlights 
the importance of a minimum viable product (MVP) necessary to test the founder’s main 
assumptions. Concluding with Accelerating, which focuses on scaling as quickly as possible, 
matter of which is not the focus of this thesis. It is inspired by the Lean Manufacturing revolution 
originated in Japan with Toyota, whose sole purpose was to unravel wasteful practices and 




results in saving time and money” (Part 2 preface)  It claims that many start-ups fail due to their 
focus on outdated notions of how effort translates to accomplishments and that building the 
perfect product will inevitably lead to astronomical success. In the author’s perspective, 
companies, and especially start-ups, misuse their time designing a rigid business plan raised on 
romantic assumptions off the market, hence not being able to adapt if the market doesn’t react in 
the proposed way (Part 1 chapter 1). Instead, it advocates for the creation of an MVP as early as 
possible, and for the integration of the “Build-Measure-Learn feedback loop”. With this 
structure, that should be iterated as many times as necessary so to fulfill and exhaust the market 
that flourishes out of the consumers’ real needs, start-ups are proven to be more flexible and 
adaptable without committing fully to an idealized plan. The author attributes failure, in addition 
to the factors stated before, to the lack emphasis start-ups give to “boring” procedures such as 
administrative tasks and accounting. On the pretense that a focus on these areas might hinder 
their creativity start-ups lose track of the information they should be gathering and focus on how 
to improve. As a recommendation the author coins the term “innovation accounting” (Part 2 
chapter 7) as a disciplined method to hold innovators accountable. It is designed to measure 
progress, set up milestones and prioritize work. 
Noam Wasserman, associate professor at Harvard Business School, and author of “The 
Founder’s Dilemma” uses data he has collected for over 12 years of work, over 36 Harvard 
Business Review case studies, and data entry points of around 10,000 founders, mainly in tech 
companies and life sciences companies, to assess the main pitfalls of start-ups. During his book 
presentation at business software org in 2012, he states that 35% of VC-Backed Ventures have 




management, while 65% of the same ventures failed due to people related tensions, either 
between co-founders, or founders and employees/business partners. Eric Ries’s book delves into 
the first group and calls start-up owners to action to prevent these pitfalls. However, “The 
Founder’s Dilemma” digs through the latter, shoveling aside idealized notions akin to gut-feeling 
and instincts. The book defines five core phases: when to found, building the team, new-venture 
hiring, beyond the team, and exit dilemmas, each with their own set of crossroads, none of which 
having a roadmap. On the founder’s side, therein lay key decisions that determine a start-up’s 
success, the first regarding relationships. In the author’s dataset, 50% of start-ups have hired 
friends or family, which for him poses a problem as it intertwines distinct relationship types, that 
of romance and friendship, and professional. The second decision respects roles, here two 
models are juxtaposed, “Neverland” where everyone gets a vote or part in the decision, or 
alternatively, the “Zeus” model, where much like in Mount Olympus, one person makes all 
decisions. It is argued that the latter is better suited for scaling and that the transition between the 
two models, can be a source of the dreaded tensions. Further along the book it is stated that the 
highest tension inducing decision is that of equity splits and that 73% of start-ups partake in them 
within the first month of founding. It is argued here that early equity decisions may become a 
looming vulture if work is distributed unevenly between the founders, thus it is urged, by 
Wasserman that  founders favor a dynamic split over a static one if they are not able to answer 
questions such as “are the future roles set?” , or “is our business model set?”, or even “ are there 
any personal uncertainties for anyone”.  Lastly, when it comes to investment the professor poises 
two different questions that need be answered in timely manner, “Do you want Smart or Dumb 




?”. While the former question addresses the issue of the advantages, or lack thereof finding 
investors that take a pivotal role in the operational and procedural side of the start-up, even if 
contrary to the founders’ original vision, the second tackles the extent as to how much the 
founder is willing to surrender control over its company. Statistically, according to the book, 
around 75% of original founders are then fired by their own board of directors. However 
alarming it may be to founders, the author states that on average founders who give up control 
have companies that are worth roughly twice as much.      
2.4. Conclusions of literature review 
The literature on the Portuguese start-up ecosystem seems to be coherent and consistent. 
Portugal, although, having a positive overall appreciation of its environment seems to struggle 
with some factors which could affect its privileged position as a major start-up hub. The essential 
takeaways to highlight are that the government seems to prioritize the prosperity of the 
ecosystem, through reduction of bureaucratic processes. However, some of its measures might be 
misdirected, especially regarding legal protections of investors, and property registration. Also, it 
is relevant to consider its push towards a better and more connected community of entrepreneurs. 
In relation to the writings of the aforementioned authors, their analysis, although of different 
branches of probable explanations for failure, seems to converge in the way both conceptualize 







3.1. Hypothesis   
Considering the literature review and insights collected at Bright pixel – a strong partner of 
SONAE investment management that focuses on incubating and helping tech related ventures - 
following the recommended research process described by Croswell (2009), some hypothesis 
regarding the research question are stated as such: 
Hypothesis 1: Legal procedures rank high in start-up founders’ pain points. 
Hypothesis 2: Founders lack a science-based/ process-driven approach to their business. 
Hypothesis 3: Tensions between founders and investors pose as an obstacle. 
3.2. Approach 
For questions that may present an expansive degree of complexity and nuance a qualitative 
research approach is better suited than a quantitative one. Qualitative research proves 
advantageous for it provides a flexible understanding and honors an inductive style focusing on 
individual meaning. (Creswell 2009). 
Out of the five most commonly used qualitative research designs, according to Leedy, P and 
Ormrod (2015), a phenomenological study refers to a person’s or a group of people’s perceptions 
of an event. It is a study almost exclusively dependent on interviews with a small selected 
sample of participants – sample size usually comprised of 5 to 25 individuals – all of whom have 
had a direct experience with the phenomenon studied, in this case founding a start-up. However, 




additional data is being found whereby the researcher can develop properties of the category and 
as the criterion for discontinuing data collection, must hold. Data saturation is not about the 
numbers per se, but about the depth of the data (Burmeister and Aitken 2012).  
3.3. Data Collection 
The primary data of this phenomenological study consists of a set of interviews with different 
founders of start-ups that operate with proximity to bright pixel, and one interview with one of 
the founders of bright pixel itself for his broader perspective. The interviews followed, as 
proposed, a semi-structured form which allowed for the founders to, within the aim and general 
topic, discourse and disclose any new angle to be considered. Length- wise, each interview 
extended from 15 to 30 minutes, and was mainly executed separately, for the exception of the 
founders of Reckon.Ai and Mind Prober which was conducted collectively. 
 Most of the interviews were conducted in Portuguese, save Bloq.it’s, which due to the founder’s 
nationality was conducted in English. When possible and with the approval of the interviewees, 
the interviews were transcribed. 
For this project, the only assumptions made are that the founders have disclosed truthful 
information, have the best interest of their own start-up, and have understood the questions 
thoroughly.  
For this study, saturation was achieved at the sample size of 8, however, in order to test 
saturation itself another interview carried out. The interview protocol and thematic concerns can 





3.4. Description of the interviewees  
 
 
Table 1 Description of interviewees 
 The interviewees, as seen in table 1, are divided between categories such as their academic and 
professional background, the customer type served, the amount of time the company has been in 
operations, and if they’ve ever raised an investment round. It is recognized that most of the 
founders have either a management/economics or engineering academic background. The 
majority has been working on their business for over a year and there is a representative split 
between business-to-consumer and business-to-business companies. Lastly, close to every start-
up has gone through the process of finding a suitable investor. Even though Oscar and the yet to 
be named venture are marked as not having their first round of investment settled, they are either 
in the process of finalizing the procedure or have gone through the process in previous start-ups 
respectively.  
The one interview that is not represented in the table is the one with one of the founders of 
Bright Pixel, Benjamin Junior, for his position differs significantly from that of start-up founders. 
The interviewee provides a more holistic and broader perspective regarding the research 






4.1 Interviews with start-up founders  
Before acknowledging what was addressed more frequently across interviews, it is paramount to 
state what was not mentioned, albeit expected according to literature review, and previous 
meetings with the advisor at bright pixel. For the interviewees, legal procedures and 
administrative tasks such as registering the company don’t appear to be relevant or decisive 
factors. Also, investor relationships have, across start-ups, been extremely positive in the sense 
that founders reported feeling supported by their investors, as well as recognizing their pivotal 
role in advancing the business, either through knowledge sharing or networking.  
Throughout the interviews with the founders there were several different issues addressed that, 
although specific to each company, had many touching points. As such, in this analysis, “pain-
points” are bundled together under the certain thematic umbrellas, despite having distinct 
technicalities, due to their overarching core issue. For example, under “Decision Times”, 
whereas bloq.it found it rather lengthy to deal with municipalities and get licenses to install their 
lockers, Taikai dealt with a long bureaucratic process closing previously agreed upon contracts 
amongst large corporations. Hence, this section is divided into three main categories that 
encompass the most relevant themes discussed amongst the interviews. The topics are 




4.1.1 Recruitment and Human Resources 
“I always thought that selling would be much harder, and it was easier. I thought hiring was easier, and 
it was much harder, it is much harder. (…) Hiring anyone is hard, but especially developers”- Advert.io 
“Incubators should have a recruitment team to help start-ups, right now it is a very hard process”- 
Js.scrambler 
“It’s really hard, in the beginning, to hire people. You just don’t have the money to hire people with 
experience, and for juniors to start contributing effectively, takes more of your precious time. (…) In my 
opinion it is very important to create a co-founding team that fulfills several roles” OSCAR 
One of the first issues recognized by founders when discussing their most compelling problems 
is that of recruiting. This sample of start-ups stated that the process of finding the right people for 
the positions in need is lengthy and costly, absorbing their key resources, time and money, 
thwarting their progress in developing their product and investor Moreover, founders reported 
that with growing and expanding start-ups human resources issues only grow exponentially. 
Working on a dynamic, fast-paced, and unpredictable environment leads often to heavy burdens 
on founders and their partners and employees, resulting in burnouts that may lead to turnover and 
diminishing productivity. 
“Managing the psychological well-being of people is hard, especially when there is so much pressure. 
Either from money running out or having too many clients. (…) I wasn’t aware of problems like this and 




4.1.2 Decision Times 
Time is the most fundamental resource for start-ups. Time to prove themselves, and their 
product-market fit, time to elaborate different strategies and theorize on possible new tactics, 
time to develop the business plan, and time to devote towards building a better relationship with 
investors. Subsequentially, the most prominent theme contemplated by start-up founders is that 
of discrepancy between their fast-paced and unbureaucratic decision making process, tailored 
towards quickness and agility, and their more established partners’, aimed at stability and 
liability assessment. Be it with large corporations in the retail industry or small investors, from 
the time where partnerships are casually agreed upon till the celebration of contracts, founders 
feel like their time is misused.  
“I had an agreement with a major partner and waited for several months before I got any official answer. 
I had to postpone a round of investment and direct myself to other types of clients because I couldn’t keep 
up.” – Taikai 
“What ends up happening is that, from the ok to getting the money is really long. Sometimes you just 
don’t have that time and you die midway. Portugal has that problem; decision is too centralized”- 
Unnamed Venture 
 “We started in March, and we were dealing with them until July, and even though it was going well, It 
was delaying a lot. (…) we still have a meeting in September or December” and we can’t wait for that 
cause then summer is over” - Bloq.it 





4.1.3 Clarity and Procedures 
When time is a rare commodity and burn rates are a constant worry for start-up founders, it is 
important that those are allocated in the most efficient way possible. The last theme, widely 
recurring in the interviews, is one linked with having a clear idea as to how the development 
process of the product should be done. Vague ideas on specifics are often counterproductive, 
leaving founders correcting and reviewing past work instead of focusing on the evolution of the 
company.  
“The whole process of product development needs to be specified very clearly, I mean, what do you want 
to develop? You can say something like, “make a button to start a campaign”, but there are distinct ways 
of doing so. The button can have a lot of different shapes, starting and launching a campaign are 
different things” – Advert.io 
“Through everything you usually go like 3/4 times. We make some mistakes and then we need a lot of 
time to correct and review” Bloq.it 
Akin to having a dubious conception of product development, having a chaotic work 
environment, usually associated with start-ups, leads to both stress-inducing behavior and a 
lackluster management of resources. Founders tend to over-intervene in every part of the 
process, from sales to development, which may result in a loss of focus and direction. 
“For people in the genesis of the company it’s really hard to let loose and trust that you can’t be in every 
part of the process. (…) I can’t let go of the sales part of the business, and I have been neglecting 




4.2 Interview with Benjamin Junior 
As stated previously, the interview with Junior aims towards getting a more holistic and broader 
perspective on the issues start-up founders face. When asked about the general topic, he gives 
insight as to how every start-up is unique and that each set of problems is remarkably complex.  
“It’s a hard question. Basically, asking that (what are the common “pain-points” he sees amongst start-
ups) is sort of like asking how the universe works. I don’t know.” 
However, he postulates splitting the question in three main themes that follow the chronological 
process of starting a new venture, operational problems (accounting and legal), team assembly, 
and interacting with investors. 
4.2.1 Operational struggles 
Junior expresses that founders have close to no knowledge on the practicalities of running a 
business from an administrative position, especially regarding accounting, (registering the 
company, invoicing, banking statements, and salaries) as well as legal responsibilities (labor law, 
contract law, employee processing, etc…).  
“These are all aspects that people, when they get to this world, don’t even imagine. Obviously, they can 
surround themselves of specialists in each of these areas, but at the end of the day, when your structures 







4.2.2 Team Assembly 
“How do you form a team with no investment? (…) It is a complex process and relies in being lucky to 
surround yourself with people as motivated as you. (…)  Right now, you either prove, extremely quickly, 
where you want to get to, or you pick up your boots and leave. You’re not going to be able to keep a 
structure for free eternally. “ 
Forming the team is a crucial stage in a start-up’s journey, according to the interviewee, it is a 
phase where there is not yet means with which to pay salaries and founders rely on the sacrifices 
made by their partners and co-founders. At this stage start-ups form their work dynamics and are 
required to convey their capabilities to external partners and investors. It is argued here that there 
is a very limited time window where companies can keep their employees working on a concept 
he coins as “sweat-equity”, before tensions arise and stress takes over.  
4.2.3 Attracting Investors 
For Junior the last of the three most important topics that may pose challenges to founders 
forming a start-up is that of attracting investors, especially how and when. For the interviewee 
here lay two different types of issues. Firstly, a lack of realism in their forecasts, described by the 
quote presented below.  
“Entrepreneurs are, by definition, very optimistic. (…) There is a golden rule in these things, you must 
triple the effort and double the costs forecasted. (…) Investment processes, in my experience, should be 
made 6-9 months prior. No one writes you a check for the following month. Don’t put yourself in a 




Secondly a shortage of emphasis on the constant need of maintaining a healthy relationship with 
a large group of investors. Since there are not enough metrics to measure the size of the business 
or to guarantee an objective appraisal of the start-ups in earlier stages, according to Junior, the 
best way founders have to attract investors is through their emotional connection and general 
sense of trustworthiness.  
“Founders have to have a constant concern of maintaining a good relationship with investors. 
Many of the decisions taken in early stage are emotional because there are no metrics of 
anything, it has a lot to do with empathy, at the end of the day, its all people, there is no formula 
where if you take out a comma it stops working.” 
5. Discussion  
5.1 Limitations & Future Works 
The study conducted focuses on a subset of founders whose “pain-points” might be skewed. In 
this sample, all of them are in some way related/ linked to an already established incubator, 
bright pixel, with its specific knowledge and experience tailored towards helping mitigate some 
of the issues present in start-ups that haven’t had the fortune of finding partners with these 
characteristics. It would be interesting, in the future, to understand if there are significant 
differences between companies operating in widely different settings or under the help of other 
incubators in Portugal. Possibly, as per future subsequent work, it could be of interest to follow 
the same set of companies presented here to either analyze their strategies to mitigate the 
problems that have arisen or evaluate how the challenges have transformed with maturity of both 




5.2 Conclusion and findings 
There are two major conclusions of the phenomenological study conducted. Firstly, that the 
perspectives of incubated start-up’s founders and the perspective of Junior, one of the incubator’s 
founding partners, on their “pain-points” are somewhat dissimilar. Secondly, that there is some 
sort of misalignment with what would be the expected “pain-points” for start-ups and the ones 
reported by start-up founders themselves.  
Although touching very similar issues, for example, both the founders and Junior state that 
investment is pivotal, their focus within the theme reveals divergent. For founders the issues 
seem to arise after finding an interested investor, especially regarding the lengthy process of 
celebrating the investment, while for Junior, the difficulty would be in attracting the investors.  
Legal and administrative issues, “pain-points” that both the literature (see hypothesis 1) and 
Junior highlight, are not even given the slightest focus by the founders. Even when asked 
directly, their answers were unambiguous. 
 Regarding the second hypothesis, Junior and the founders recognize the chaotic environment 
and emotional approach to business. Even though all of the founders use some kind of metrics to 
evaluate their progress, their procedures and approach are improvised, which may delay their 
progress.  
The third hypothesis stands in stark contrast with the results found through the interviews. Not 
only have the founders not mentioned having a tense relationship with investors and co-founders, 
their experience has been, reportedly, overwhelmingly positive. Investors, throughout the 
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Appendix 1. Interview Script 
Before the interview: Founder’s Background; Insights (Age, Round of investment, B2B/B2C) 
Interview: 
Topic 1. Open question - How did it start? 
Did you use any framework for the formulation of the idea (Business Model canvas, value proposition 
canvas)? 
What surprised you the most between what was expected to fail and what indeed failed? Which one are 
specific to the industry you’re in and which ones are broader? 
How did you mitigate those problems? 
Which ones do you still tackle? 
What’s your biggest pain? 
Topic 2. Open Question: Funding 
 How did you select the type of investor? How SMART was the investment? 
Did you have any personal issues with the investors? 
What was the report period? Did you use any platform to do it? 
Was the investment always done through equity? 
Did they reinvest?  
Topic 3. Close question: Metrics 
Which metrics do you use to evaluate the evolution of your products? 
